Abstract: This paper questions whether discrimination between consumers by a dominant undertaking can and should constitute an abuse of a dominant position under Article 82EC. By finding that it can, the paper challenges the traditional interpretation of the discrimination ban under that provision, namely that discrimination constitutes abuse only when directed against the intermediate customers of the dominant undertaking. As such, the paper seeks to clarify the scope of Article 82EC as regards discrimination, and elaborate on whether discrimination between consumers should be abusive. This is done from both a law and an economics perspective, in order to put forward a proposal to ensure that competition law does not prohibit discrimination where economics finds it potentially welfare enhancing.
A Introduction
The word 'discrimination' may quickly set alarms bells ringing for a person brought up in a democratic society believing in the sanctity of ideals such as 'equality' and 'fairness'. Although this may be a natural result of its usually being used in contexts such as racial, sexual or religious discrimination, carried on to the competition law arena, this conception may lead to perverse outcomes. Indeed, 'discrimination' may sound benign, for example, to an economist who understands it as a common business practice with ambiguous effects on welfare. One area in which this difference can give rise to tension but has been mostly disregarded so far is the treatment of discrimination between consumers by a dominant undertaking under EC competition law. The questions this paper seeks to answer are thus whether discrimination between 'consumers' 1 by a dominant undertaking can breach Article 82EC and if so, whether it should constitute an abuse of a dominant position.
The answers to this query would firstly clarify the scope of the ban on discrimination since to date disputes under that provision have mainly arisen out of business-to-business transactions. Supported by the wording of Article 82(c)EC 2 requiring discrimination to place the dominant undertaking's 'trading parties' at a 'competitive disadvantage', particularly in the literature, the prohibition has been understood as confined to discrimination directed at other undertakings. This paper challenges the traditional interpretation and seeks to show that discrimination can be an abuse of a dominant position even when directed at consumers. Secondly, the paper questions whether it is appropriate for discrimination between consumers to be an abuse of a dominant position by mainly drawing on results from economics on price discrimination. In other words, it seeks to show how one can ensure that unalike' and prohibiting discrimination can easily thought to be grounded in 'fairness', its dictates may not always be 'efficient'. Thus, these are important concerns that have to be considered while trying to answer whether discrimination between consumers should be a type of abuse.
The paper firstly sets out the definition of discrimination relevant for Article 82EC in Section B, along with the possible consequences of different definitions in law and economics. Although the paper considers discrimination under Article 82EC in general, it concentrates on 'price discrimination' as a common and obvious practice of it. Since the current interpretation of Article 82(c)EC limits its scope to business-to-business conduct and this is arguably supported by the wording of the provision, in order to clarify the understanding being challenged, these are dealt with in Section C as arguments against including discrimination between consumers in the provision. Subsequently, Section D explains the arguments for the inclusion of discrimination between consumers in the scope. Section E then elaborates on whether discrimination between consumers should be an abuse, attempting to marry law and economics. Section F concludes.
B Definition of Discrimination Relevant for Article 82EC
Discrimination is a practice inherently difficult to define since it is necessary to determine the conditions under which two transactions may be deemed equivalent and thus comparable. In addition, it requires the assessment of the criteria which render the treatment of the two transactions dissimilar. For example, it must be decided whether the sales of two rail tickets to two consumers for the same journey by the same company are equivalent transactions even though the sales occur at different times or even though one of the consumers' willingness to pay is higher than the other's. For the purposes of competition law, the potential tension between law and economics arises straight away with the definition of 'discrimination' and it is perhaps fair to say that so far neither of these disciplines has been able to construe discrimination satisfactorily enough for a consistent application across the board in conformity with legal certainty.
Article 82EC does not define discrimination but bans the application of dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with different trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage. This has been interpreted to also include the similar treatment of dissimilar transactions. 8 Hence, when it is determined that two transactions are equivalent (nonequivalent), then the undertaking should treat these transactions similarly (dissimilarly). As for economics, the study of discrimination has mainly concentrated on 'price discrimination', but the definition of it appears to be problematic in this discipline as well. For example, in the EAGCP Report commissioned by the EC Directorate-General for Competition, price discrimination is defined as 'charging different prices for different units and/or to different customers'. 9 A different definition is the ability to set prices so that the difference between average prices and average costs varies between different sales of either the same good or closely related goods. 10 The practice has also been described as making two sales at two different rates of return; two sales are discriminatory when they have different ratios of price to marginal cost. 11 Whereas the EAGCP Report's definition is closer to Article 82(c)EC, the more common approach in economics appears to be treating only the differences that are not due or proportionate to cost differences as 'discrimination'. 12 Thus, in the example above, charging a higher price to the commuter on the train who had the ticket delivered to his home rather than picking it up at the station would not be economically discriminatory so long as 8 12 See for example Tirole: '… there is no price discrimination if differences in prices between consumers exactly reflect differences in the costs of serving these consumers …' J Tirole The Theory of Industrial Organization (9 th ed The MIT Press Cambridge Massachusetts 1997) 133-134. 'Price discrimination' can take one of three forms: first-degree, second-degree and third-degree. 'First-degree' (perfect) price discrimination refers to the situation when the firm has perfect information on the willingness to pay of each consumer. Thus, the firm can charge each consumer a price equal to his/her willingness to pay. In 'second-degree' price discrimination, a firm cannot identify the customers between whom it would like to discriminate. By the use of self-select mechanisms, however, the firm may induce consumers to sort themselves in a way that allows additional surplus to be extracted. 'Third-degree' price discrimination or market segmentation is when the firm is aware of willingness to pay across groups, but not within a group and charges different prices to different groups. See in general Church and Ware (n 10) 161-162. the price difference reflects this cost difference. In the same manner, charging the same price to both commuters regardless of this cost difference would be economically discriminatory.
In contrast to this general economic definition, some decisions under Article 82(c)EC imply that it is broad enough to treat any difference in treatment of similar transactions as discriminatory. Conduct can then be defended by an 'objective justification' (such as cost differences) by the undertaking. Indeed, the Commission has held in its Portuguese Airports decision that ' [t] here must be an objective justification for any difference in treatment of its various clients by an undertaking in a dominant position. ' 13 Similarly in Aeroports de Paris the CFI held with regard to the policy of the airport manager ADP that '… the Commission was justified in inferring from the difference in rates of the fees demanded from the groundhandlers by ADP that ADP was imposing discriminatory fees, unless it justified that difference in treatment by objective reasons.' 14 Moreover, it was found that 'in the event of disparity, it is for ADP to justify the reasons for and correctness of the differences in the rates of fee applied to different groundhandlers operating at Orly and Roissy-CDG airports.' 15 The CFI has also held in Tetra Pak II as regards Tetra Pak's differential pricing of machines that '[i]n the absence of any argument by the applicant which might provide objective justification for its pricing policy, such disparities were unquestionably discriminatory…'. 16 Likewise in the US, to prove price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act, one needs to show only a 'price difference'. '… a price discrimination within the meaning of that provision is merely a price difference'. The defendant can then claim a 'cost justification' defence to show that the different prices were not discriminatory. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that unlike EC competition law, the Robinson-Patman Act does not prohibit charging the same price for dissimilar transactions. See Hovenkamp (n 11) for the argument that it is a misnomer to call the Robinson-Patman Act a 'price discrimination' statute since it directly condemns price differences, and only indirectly and haphazardly reaches economic discrimination, 581. The ironic result has been to force many sellers to engage in true economic price discrimination by charging the same price to different groups of buyers, even though costs of serving them differ, 587.
This difference in defining discrimination can potentially affect the procedure and, particularly, the burden of proof. 'Objective justification' is a defence possible for any allegedly abusive conduct and the burden of proving it is on the dominant undertaking once the conduct is shown on its face to be an abuse. 18 However, when the economic definition is adopted, the burden to prove that, for example, the difference in prices is not due to a difference in costs and thus not objectively justified would be on the Commission since only then would the practice be 'discriminatory'. Under the current interpretation (similar to the Robinson-Patman Act), the burden is on the dominant undertaking to demonstrate that the allegedly abusive different (or uniform)
prices are justified and thus should not be prohibited. Therefore, if the undertaking cannot convince the Commission of this justification, the Commission can find abuse on the basis of mere differential (or uniform)
pricing without having proved the prices to be economically discriminatory. 19 This is a consequence of the legal test being two-staged in that it firstly asks whether the prices are different and if so, whether this can be objectively justified, as opposed to the single-staged economic test which questions whether the price-cost ratios, ie the profit margins in two equivalent transactions are different.
Nevertheless, the adoption of the economic definition of discrimination may not be desirable for EC competition law since the competition authority may not be able to assess the costs of the dominant undertaking prima facie, that is before and without alleging that the differential (or uniform) pricing is abusive. It can only examine the occurrence of differential (or uniform) pricing and cannot know without further investigation whether the differential (or uniform) pricing is economically discriminatory (ie not due or proportionate to cost differences). Since the dominant undertaking would have the relevant cost information, the use of that information as an objective justification by the undertaking may be the more feasible and efficient approach. Moreover, 18 Jones and Sufrin (n 3) 282. See also EC Discussion Paper (n 5) noting that what is apparent in discrimination cases to date is that it is the criteria relating to the transaction, rather than to the customer engaged in the transaction which is important. 21 Although it has been argued that the Some support for this last argument can also be found in economics. After stating that an important assumption of his book's study of second-degree price discrimination is the independence of consumers' demands from those of other consumers, Tirole notes that the quality offered to a consumer may, however, depend on the choices of other consumers. capacity (as in the telephone, electric power and air travel industries). He gives the example of an electric utility, with a fixed capacity for a given period of time which faces uncertain demand or supply. During peak load, electricity must be rationed to some consumers. Random rationing generally is not efficient, as some consumers suffer more than others from the interruption of service. A spot market, on the other hand, would allocate the limited capacity efficiently among consumers in each state of nature, as those who would pay the spot price are those who suffer most from an interruption. Such a spot market, however, is generally infeasible because of the high transaction costs of setting it up. As an imperfect substitute for spot markets, the firm may offer priority of service, that is probability of being interrupted. In this case, the interdependence of demands is apparent: if all consumers choose the top priority, no one has any priority. Thus, the firm must adequately compute the tariff for each priority class to match capacity and demand. 38 Although Tirole's example is related to the quality of the product, when supply is limited at a level below the equilibrium output, for example, due to capacity constraints, even with regard to quantity the demand of consumers could be deemed interdependent. In that case, consumers can be thought to be competing with one another for the product since not all of them can purchase it due to limited supply, even if they all value it above the price. The queues starting early in the morning when a new version of the Microsoft Xbox is released is an example of this. Moreover, some marginal consumers can also be left out of the market depending on the willingness of other consumers, further up the demand curve, to pay.
In sum, the letter of Article 82(c)EC can be interpreted to include discrimination between consumers in its scope.
38 Tirole (n 12) 152.
D Arguments for Including Discrimination between Consumers in the Scope of Article 82EC
It is not easy to tell why the question of whether discrimination in business-toconsumer transactions is covered by Article 82EC has not been answered so far. It may be due to the loyalty to a strict reading of the provision and the nonexistent private enforcement of Article 82EC. It is also plausible that the Commission and the Courts have been refraining from making general statements on the matter as they have not been faced with it directly although their inclination has been implicitly expressed. Indeed, one can find that the EC Commission and the Courts have expressed a tendency towards including discrimination between consumers within the scope of Article 82EC albeit quietly. The remainder of this section will try to explain this stance along with other arguments for why discrimination against consumers by a dominant undertaking can be abusive.
Jurisprudence on Discrimination and Consumers
Particularly the late decisional practice of both the Commission and the Courts supports an affirmative answer to the question of whether discrimination in business-to-consumer transactions can be challenged under Article 82EC.
Some of the most obvious expressions can be found in the Commission's 1998 Football World Cup decision. The dispute there had arisen out of the French organiser CFO's requiring the general public to provide an address in France in order to be able to purchase individual entry tickets and Pass France 98 (which was a package comprising five or six separate entry tickets).
The Commission held that … the CFO was, as a de facto monopolist, under a prima facie obligation to ensure that entry tickets sold in 1996 and 1997 for finals matches were made available to the general public under non-discriminatory arrangements throughout the EEA, even though demand from consumers outside France for certain ticket products may have been relatively small as against the demand from the general public in France. Although the decision blurs the issue by stating that 'the CFO abused its dominant position on the relevant markets because its behaviour had the effect of imposing unfair trading conditions on residents outside France which resulted in a limitation of the market to the prejudice of those consumers' 40 and thus referring to Article 82(a) and (b)EC, it condemns the effect of the requirement to provide a postal address in France. The effect is deemed to discriminate specifically against the general public resident outside France, given that those resident in France were significantly better placed to meet the requirement. 41 The effect of CFO's behaviour was described as 'to discriminate against residents outside France, which indirect(ly) amounted to discrimination against those consumers on grounds of nationality, contrary to (2001) where the US Supreme Court held that different prices paid by end users and wholesale distributors of the same gas lift equipment did not breach the Robinson-Patman Act since end users who buy directly from the manufacturer do not compete with the wholesale distributors for resale at any level, 289. It must be noted though that the Robinson-Patman Act prohibits discrimination '… where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them…'. Thus, its language requiring discrimination to 'injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person' is different than position by charging a different fee for the provision of certificates of conformity depending on whether the customer was a trader or an individual (or an independent dealer). 54 In the same manner, although not taking a formal decision due to reaching an agreement with the undertaking, the Commission found Deutsche Telekom AG's business customer tariffs discriminating in favour of its business customers vis-à-vis residential customers and hence potentially abusive. section.
E Should Discrimination between Consumers Be an Abuse under Article

82EC?
After finding that discrimination between consumers can be abusive under the current law, the important question becomes that of whether it should be so.
This question arises because according to economics, discrimination is a practice with ambiguous effects on total and consumer welfare. As such, it is argued that the welfare effects of discrimination require a case-by-case analysis and a blanket prohibition of it is not justified. 79 Nonetheless, as Article 82EC has so far been interpreted as banning discrimination in business-tobusiness transactions, it remains to be answered whether such a ban is also unjustified when it is applicable to business-to-consumer transactions since Moreover, the recent tendency regarding the application of Article 82EC
shows that the emphasis is on consumer welfare, even if not exclusively. In other words, it is quite clear that if conduct actually or potentially harms consumers it will fall foul of Article 82EC. Thus, under a consumer welfare standard the discriminatory conduct of an undertaking in a dominant position should be scrutinised with regard to its effects even when observed in business-to-consumer conduct as it may have negative effects on consumer welfare.
Fairness
Admittedly, fairness does not fall squarely under the arguments for covering discrimination between consumers under Article 82EC. This is because whether discrimination is unfair or not depends on one's understanding of 'fairness'. Since there is not a universal definition of 'fairness' or 'unfairness', the assessment of discrimination hinges on the interpretation of the 'fairness' concept. When 'fairness' is understood as the equal treatment of equals (and the unequal treatment of unequals), the EC ban on discrimination described as 'applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions' appears fair and, thus, legitimate. 89 Therefore, as regards price discrimination, fairness understood as 'equality' 90 would result in uniform prices for equivalent purchases. In the train example, different prices paid by the professional and the student for the same journey would be discriminatory and unfair so long as the purchases can be deemed equivalent. Whether or not the different status of the commuters render the transactions non-equivalent is a different question, but once the focus is on the transaction rather than the parties and it is thus decided that the transactions are equivalent, then the different prices would be unfair. If, however, fairness is understood from a distributional 88 Perrot (n 87) 163-4. 89 For the argument that a standard such as the equal treatment of parties in similar positions is not helpful for antitrust since '[i]f the parties are really equally situated, the market will treat them equally, for that will be the most profitable way to treat them' see RH Bork 'The Goals of Antitrust Policy ' (1967) perspective, it would be 'fair' for the commuter with the lower income to pay a lower price for the ticket than the one with the higher income.
Although it cannot be denied that 'fairness' as an objective has played a prominent role in the adoption of Article 82EC due to the ordoliberal influences at the time, 91 and that Article 82EC's prohibitions of unfair pricing, unfair trading conditions and discrimination are undoubtedly related to fairness, this may not be deemed appropriate any more. 92 Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that the ban on discrimination is quite different from the other types of 'unfair' conduct prohibited by Article 82EC. This is because the other types of unfair behaviour described there cannot even be objectively defined and thus their prohibition poses a greater risk to legal certainty and freedom of contract than the ban on discrimination. 93 Moreover, particularly the bans on 'unfair pricing'
and perhaps 'unfair trading conditions' -which are reflections of a substantive fairness ideal in competition law -remain as almost unenforceable pieces of law for the competition authority as well.
The ban on discrimination is different from the ban on unfair pricing or unfair trading conditions because 'discrimination' can at least be defined to a greater extent than the latter. Although it is not always easy to assess which transactions, conditions and/or parties are equivalent, once (or if) this is determined, the ban on discrimination can be operationalised. In other words, the current understanding of discrimination as the unequal treatment of equals The best example of this can be found in price discrimination. Since price is seen as a tool by which the dominant firm exploits its power to earn more profits, price discrimination is also considered to be 'unfair' because some people pay more for the good in question than others. Moreover, economic analysis has put a lot of weight on the exploitative effects of price discrimination allowing the dominant firm to earn more profits. Economic analysis has also stressed that distribution of output across consumers tends to be inefficient if different consumers pay different prices and presumably put different valuations on the last units they purchase. The fairness assessment of discrimination is a markedly peculiar issue due to the perception of 'fairness' as 'equality'. For example, universal service obligations tend to insist on 'equal treatment', according to which all consumers should be offered the same price even in spite of possible large cost differentials. 99 In other words, although the costs differ and thus the obligation of, for instance, national pricing in universal services requires discrimination in economic terms, this is not condemned by law due to other social policy objectives. 100 An equally interesting example is postal services, since even though it would cost more to run a post office in a rural area, charging a higher price reflecting the higher costs to the consumers in the rural area compared to the price of the same service at urban branches would probably be perceived as unfair at least by the consumers in the rural area.
Although 'equality' and 'equal treatment' may be more easily acceptable in policy and law than differential treatment, from an economic point of view, uniformity can also constitute discrimination. Indeed, 'fair price' may actually require discrimination. This can be derived from the model of Rabin, as well as that of Fehr and Schmidt. 101 The key insight from both models is that the 'fair' price would depend on the consumer's valuation of the product. 102 The result of this is that since consumers' valuations of the same product would in most cases be different, the 'fair' price would also differ from one consumer to another depending on the consumer's valuation. Hence, there is not a single 'fair' price but there are different individually fair prices. This necessitates different prices to be offered to different people for the same product -namely discrimination. In other words, these economic models would mean that the 'fair' price is actually 'discriminatory' in competition law terms. Moreover, the notion that two customers should pay the same price, regardless of their degree of preference for the product, as marked by the price they are willing to pay (ie elasticity), and regardless of their bargaining power on 'fairness' grounds, has been criticised as having nothing to do with competition or the efficient allocation of resources. 104 Economic analysis has shown that in some circumstances price discrimination can increase total welfare and even consumer welfare -notably when it permits a significant expansion of output. 105 Therefore, such considerations have led economists to be sceptical about using notions of 'fairness' or 'unfairness' to assess price discrimination. It has been noted that prohibiting price discrimination on the grounds of unfairness to those consumers who have to pay a higher price may end up making these very consumers worse off. 106 Furthermore, it has been argued that the fairness or unfairness of price discrimination is necessarily based on a local assessment of distributive effects and there is no way of telling whether such local assessment is consistent with global concerns for distribution. Such global concerns can hardly be made the subject of antitrust proceedings under a rule of law and therefore it seems advisable to assess price discrimination less in terms of fairness and more in terms of procompetitive and anticompetitive effects. 107 All in all, it is particularly unclear whether fairness arguments support uniform prices or discriminatory price schemes with individualised prices.
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103 Although this conclusion depends on whether the difference between the valuations of consumers would render the transactions non-equivalent and thus out of scope of Article 82(c)EC, that question has not been answered. In other words, whether customer-specific reasons would provide an objective justification for the ban on discrimination is not yet clear but as so far construed, it is the criteria relating to the transactions rather than the customer that matters. See text around n 21. 104 Lage and Allendesalazar (n 29) 344. 105 EAGCP Report (n 5) 31. For example, when discrimination expands output so that customer segments that would otherwise be excluded are served, it might stimulate profits so as to enable investment projects that would not otherwise be taken; returns from discrimination may encourage firms to invest more, etc; TP Gehrig and R Stenbacka 'Price Discrimination, Competition and Antitrust' Therefore, 'fairness' supports equivocal conclusions depending on the interpretation of the concept as regards the inclusion of discrimination between consumers under the prohibition of discrimination in Article 82EC.
However, this discussion is not limited to discrimination between consumers, but is related in general to the question of whether Article 82EC should ban discrimination at all.
Implications of Prohibiting Discrimination between Consumers under Article 82EC
Once it is realised that discrimination between consumers can also be scrutinised under Article 82EC, this would increase the obligations of dominant undertakings compared to the status quo. They would then have to refrain from entering into discriminatory transactions not only with other undertakings, but also with consumers. Apart from bringing with it the risk of over-intervention into the practices of private law entities, this would directly limit their freedom of contract to a greater degree than under the current interpretation in the literature.
Moreover, modern economics shows that discrimination can both increase and decrease welfare. The economic studies -generally concentrated on price discrimination -find that the welfare effects depend mainly on whether discrimination causes output to increase or decrease. 109 For example, in industries with fixed and common costs, such as airlines, hotels and cinemas, discrimination can be beneficial as it can lower the price to all users of the service due to the costs being spread over more customers. 110 However, as put by Motta, ' [e]conomic theory shows that price discrimination unambiguously reduces welfare only when it does not raise total output, whereas the sign of welfare change is ambiguous in all other cases.' forms of price discrimination may have very different impacts on consumers' surplus, as well as on firms' surplus. 112 Hence, the welfare effects of price discrimination require a case-by-case analysis. 113 Furthermore, economics also shows that in some cases the effects of discrimination between consumers are not easily determined and may boil down to an assessment of the curvature of total demand for the products. An example can be found in spatial price discrimination.
The products of spatial competitors are differentiated in their physical location or in their products' attributes. 114 In an important class of spatial models and many real-world markets, the consumers to whom one firm would like to raise price -its strong market -are another firm's weak market to which it would like to lower price ('best-response asymmetry'). 115 When this asymmetry exists, the equilibrium outcome of spatial competitors reacting to each other's discriminatory price reductions may be lower prices for all consumers and lower profits for all firms, compared to an equilibrium in which all firms offer uniform pricing to all consumers. 116 A necessary condition for 'competitive spatial price discrimination' (CPSD) to obtain is that each firm's strong market is at least one other firm's weak market and vice-versa. Thus, CPSD should be distinguished from another common sort of price discrimination that arises when firms agree on which consumer groups are strong markets and which are weak markets ('best-response symmetry'). This latter results in discrimination in the form of pricing strategies, such as movie discounts for students, early-bird dinner specials, or higher airfares for business travellers, and does not necessarily result in more intense competition than uniform pricing. Thus, when firms agree on which customers are strong markets (and 112 Perrot (n 87) 168. See also Lowe who argues that while some consumers will pay a higher price and others will pay a lower price, collectively consumers will have to pay more to finance the extra profits obtained by the supplier and to cover the extra costs of supporting the price discrimination scheme. Therefore, consumer welfare will in general decline unless it can be clearly shown that otherwise the lower priced market(s) would not be served at all and that therefore the price discrimination will lead to an undisputable increase of output. It is only in the latter case that consumer welfare may actually increase; P Lowe 'Current Issues of E.U. which are weak markets), all firms have an incentive to offer higher prices to the same group of customers.
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When firms agree on which markets are weak and which are strong, the effects of price discrimination are harder to determine. Since firms agree on the customers to whom they raise and lower price, competitive reactions to rivals may reinforce the initial responses of higher and lower prices. The net overall effect of price discrimination on welfare is determined by the degree to which prices increase for strong-market consumers and fall for weak-market consumers which in turn depends on the curvature, the own-price elasticity, and the cross-price elasticity of demand. Moreover, it must be remembered that guaranteeing 'fair competition' has been recognised as one of the aims in the preamble of the EC Treaty alongside steady expansion and balanced trade. In any case, this goes back to the question of whether competition law should merely aim at enhancing efficiency or can also aim to achieve other aims, such as 'fairness'. 117 Cooper Froeb O'Brien Tschantz (n 114) 329. 118 Moreover, it also points out the trade-off issue. One of the arguments of the mobile network operators in that case was that because most people had a
mobile phone, what they lost in high termination charges they gained in low access and outgoing call charges. 127 OFTEL countered that although these people may be the same in some cases, there was a significant number of people for whom the adverse effect could be important. 128 Even if the proportion of the population adversely affected was quite modest, for example around 10%, this would be a large amount of people (around 5 million).
Moreover, OFTEL believed that the people most adversely affected were those without a mobile phone -around 15% of the population -and this group had a disproportionate number of elderly and low-income people in it.
The Competition Commission held that it was not necessary to decide whether fixed line-only or mobile-only customers would be the more advantaged or disadvantaged by a price control on termination charges. 129 All those who have both a fixed line and a mobile phone would suffer a detriment to the extent that they use their fixed line instead of their mobile phone to call a mobile phone or make more off-net calls to mobiles than they receive. The group of payphone users who called mobiles but did not own mobile phones themselves were also found to contribute unfairly to funding the mobile network operators' customers through high termination charges.
The Competition Commission explicitly held that although the investigated pricing structure may, in theory, be an efficient way to recover fixed and common costs, there are other considerations that it believed necessary to take into account in assessing whether a particular pricing structure operated in the public interest. 130 One of these other considerations was whether the pricing structure was equitable as among different telecommunications users. 131 What would have been the outcome of this case had it occurred in the EC remains debatable but there is a high probability that it would have been different under an approach excluding 'fairness' as an objective.
In a similar case, the Czech Republic Supreme Court affirmed the national competition authority's decision of fining Eurotel -the third largest Czech mobile operator -around €1.6 million for charging its mobile phone users a In another case, the UK Competition Commission found the practice of geographical price discrimination of some supermarkets which consisted of 130 Vodafone, O2, Orange and T-Mobile Report (n 120) [2.402] . 131 Nevertheless, the Competition Commission found that the data is insufficiently robust by itself to support conclusions leading to action as regards the distributional arguments. Yet, it held that the fixed network operators' customers unfairly bore the costs of the distorted pricing structure and this was an important element of the argument that action should be taken to reduce the termination charges; Vodafone, O2, Orange and T-Mobile Report (n 120) [2.428] charging lower prices to consumers in some localities to be against public interest. 134 As another example of scrutiny of discrimination between consumers, the practice of varying prices in different geographical locations in the light of local competitive conditions, such variation not being related to costs as carried on by some supermarkets was found to distort competition.
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The conduct, when carried out by Safeway, Sainsbury and Tesco, who had market power, operated against public interest because their customers tended to pay more at stores that did not face particular competitors than they would if those competitors had been present in the area. 136 The practice distorted competition in the retail supply of groceries in that it tended to focus some element of price competition into localities where particular lower-priced competitors were present and away from other areas, and contributed to the position that a majority of grocery products were not fully exposed to competitive pressure. 137 The Competition Commission held that
[t]o the extent that consumers who shop in each of these supermarket fascias pay more for their groceries in some areas than in others, and to the extent that cost variations do not account for the differences, the practice has obvious adverse effects because it discriminates between different consumers. Some consumers pay more than they otherwise would, but only because certain competitors are not present in their area.
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It is striking that the Competition Commission reached this decision despite its recognition that some prices were set in response to regional and local factors such as average local incomes or local customer price sensitivity. 139 In other words, lower prices in the low-income areas were nevertheless found to be against the public interest merely because they did not reflect costs, 134 
Reconciliation with Economics
When taking everyday price-related decisions, undertakings should be able to assess whether their practices fall foul of Article 82EC with sufficient certainty.
After finding that discrimination in business-to-consumer transactions can breach Article 82EC as the law currently is and there are some legitimate reasons for it to do so, the ultimate concern appears to be the reconciliation of this with economics. This is because an outright ban on discrimination between consumers is not justified without a consideration of its effects on welfare. In other words, it must be ensured that competition law only forbids discrimination that is harmful to consumer welfare and does not prevent discrimination that is welfare-enhancing.
At first glance, the most plausible way of doing this appears to be the 'objective justification' defence by which the dominant undertaking can prove that its conduct does not constitute abuse. Moreover, as mentioned above, 143 in many cases the Commission and the Courts have implicitly or explicitly stated that any differential treatment of trading parties should be objectively justified by the dominant undertaking to escape the prohibition of Article 82EC. Nonetheless, the understanding of this defence in the EC Discussion
Paper raises problems for such a finding. This is because the EC Discussion Paper -which is the only Community document elaborating on the issue in detail -states that there are two types of objective justification; first, the 'objective necessity defence' and second, the 'meeting competition defence'. 144 For the first type of objective justification, based on objective factors that apply to all undertakings, conduct must be necessary in that without it the products concerned cannot or will not be produced or distributed in the market. 145 In other words, conduct must be indispensable. As for the second type of objective justification, conduct should be a response to low pricing by others; the aim should be to minimise short run losses resulting directly from competitors' actions. 146 Conduct must again be indispensable.
The implication of this is that if the Commission adopts the same understanding of objective justification for discriminatory abuses as well, discrimination between consumers by a dominant undertaking can hardly be defended by an 'objective justification', since it will seldom be 'indispensable'; the undertaking can always price uniformly. 147 The perverse result of this can be that although discrimination could increase consumer welfare as opposed to uniform pricing, the undertaking would not be able to defend such a practice merely because it was not an 'indispensable' action. Thus, objective justification as interpreted by the Commission would not save welfareenhancing discrimination from the prohibition of Article 82EC.
Another possible defence elaborated on by the Commission in the Discussion
Paper is the 'efficiency defence'; the undertaking can demonstrate that its conduct produces efficiencies which outweigh the negative effect on competition. 148 The dominant undertaking must be able to show that the efficiencies brought about by the conduct outweigh the likely negative effects on competition resulting from the conduct and therewith the likely harm to consumers that the conduct might otherwise have. 149 Nevertheless, the efficiency defence understood as such does not serve the purpose here either since for the defence to be applicable, conduct must first of all cause likely harm to consumers. The defence is not appropriate since discrimination which arguably enhances consumer welfare would not be likely to harm consumers.
What the inapplicability of these defences shows is that the types of discrimination found to be potentially consumer welfare-enhancing according to economics should not be found abusive to begin with. In other words, the assessment should be done in the definition and finding of 'abuse'. For example, if price discrimination increases output by sales to consumers who would have been left out of the market under uniform pricing, and on aggregate consumer welfare is increased as a result, then this should not be an 'abuse'. This should be deemed 'legitimate' or 'normal' competition and the undertaking should not be punished for increasing both consumer and total welfare merely because its practice was not 'indispensable'. 150 The same would be true for discrimination aimed at covering fixed and common costs of the undertaking by expanding output. Thus, the dominant undertaking should be able to prove that discrimination increases output as this is the minimum (necessary but not sufficient) condition for discrimination to increase consumer welfare. The comparative benchmark would be the case under uniform pricing. 151 Since a dominant undertaking discriminating between consumers must be doing this knowingly and for a purpose, it must have a strategy that it can prove not to be welfare-decreasing when faced with an allegation of abuse. Even when it has no purpose other than maximising its profits, so long as this does not cause a loss of consumer welfare compared to uniform pricing (and does not have foreclosure effects), it should not be deemed abusive. 150 For the argument that efficiencies should be included in the assessment of whether competition is 'normal', that is 'competition on the merits' or not eee E Rousseva issue in that some consumers may be paying higher prices than they would under uniform pricing as a result of discrimination, the only objective assessment in conformity with legal certainty is to look at consumer welfare in the aggregate. If discrimination results in some consumers being exploited and these are consumers worthy of more protection than the ones benefiting from discrimination, then that protection should be provided by other means, such as regulation. Thus, the trade-off problem is solved by choosing the welfare of the consumers in general. This is because if the undertaking's conduct is on the whole not harmful to consumers, then it should not be punished for having caused harm to some consumers. On the other hand, if its discrimination merely results in some consumers being exploited as compared to uniform pricing with no off-setting benefits to consumers as a whole, then this can be found abusive. Nonetheless, as long as there are no foreclosure effects, whether or not this is a problem that should be dealt with by competition law rather than, for example, consumer protection law or regulation, is debatable.
F Conclusion
This paper has sought to demonstrate that the ban on discrimination under Article 82EC is not limited to business-to-business transactions, but also covers direct discrimination in business-to-consumer transactions. Hence, a dominant undertaking applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions which it enters into with different consumers can abuse its position and be punished for it if other conditions of Article 82EC are met.
Nonetheless, the implications of this finding cannot be easily categorised as desirable or undesirable from a policy point of view. One consequence of it is broadening the scope of Article 82EC and thus, the special responsibility of dominant undertakings. This brings along a serious possibility of overintervention into the practices of private law entities threatening their freedom of contract, particularly because the practice is one with ambiguous welfare
152 See text around n 118 and n 127.
effects according to economics. On the other hand, it is again this ambiguity that may justify the ban of discrimination exploiting some consumers. As a result, the competition authority may have to not only choose between fairness and efficiency, but also make trade-offs between the interests of different consumer groups. The middle ground -that discrimination is not to be found abusive when the undertaking can prove that it increases output compared to uniform pricing, increases aggregate consumer welfare and the authority cannot prove exclusionary effects -appears to be the appropriate solution.
With the reform of Article 82EC on the way, its reach must be recognised properly, and a coherent framework should be adopted to cover its whole scope accordingly. Realising that discrimination between consumers can also give rise to an abuse and elaborating on an approach in conformity with economic findings on discrimination would be a step towards such an application for the EC authorities, and as such increase legal certainty for the undertakings. 
